




The governance of public schooling in South Africa and the middle-class: 
social solidarity for the public good versus class interest. 
 
 




The article examines the unintended class differentiated and inequality reproducing effects of 
post-apartheid educational legislation. It does so through an analysis of government policies 
informing school governance and key policy makers in the education sector. It argues that 
such policies have had the unintended consequence of creating an unequal two-tier education 
structure in South Africa. While formally de-racialising schooling and aiming to make it 
more equitable the policies have not fundamentally eradicated the class and race bifurcation 
of the education system. As such a relatively well functioning, well-resourced semi-private 
education for the middle-class, stands in stark contrast to a largely dysfunctional poorly 
resourced system for the disadvantaged poorer majority. Policy has thus permitted the middle 
class to secure control of the historically white school sector, facilitating a ‘new de-racialised 
middle class’ who have ‘opted out’ of the public system of schooling in favour of semi-
privatised schooling. The introduction of ‘no fee’ schools to address concerns of educational 
affordability and access in poor communities also fails to address the underlying structural 
issue of inequality. The paper concludes by examining re-distributive policy alternatives 
based on social justice, which can realise a far more fundamental re-distribution of 






The post-apartheid state introduced a range of measures and mechanisms within the de-
racialised distributional regime to improve the lives of those previously disadvantaged, 
including in the fields of education, social welfare, and labour market policies and practices. 
Badat and Sayed (2014) argue that the state also propelled (in significant ways) the increase 
of a black economic elite and middle class in post-apartheid South Africa. But the main 
consequence was that the black middle class benefited mainly from post-apartheid 
affirmative action policies, to the detriment of the poor and the unemployed. The system of 
education governance in South Africa demonstrates the challenges of addressing class based 
inequality and the unintended consequences of government education policy aimed at re-
dressing the structural legacy of apartheid era schooling. The evidence suggests that the 
beneficiaries of the government’s decentralised school governance policies have been mainly 
wealthy and middle-class South Africans.i By virtue of their residential mobility and wealth 
they have been able to secure school places for their children in public fee-charging schools 
located in wealthier suburbs and neighbourhoods (Sayed and Ahmed 2009). Such policies as 
discussed below make the wealthier sections of society pay more for their own schooling, 
while the fee exemption policy protects those who are unable to pay the fees that wealthier 
schools charge. Schooling in post-1994 democratic South Africa continues therefore to reflect 
the geographies of inequality established in the apartheid era and have reinforced limited 
social mobility for the vast majority of South Africans.  
On the other hand, the new funding formulas for schools, key to the policies of 
devolved school governance, have arguably promoted greater equity. Polices on school 
governance and the fiscal provisions of the funding formulae have thus resulted in the 
creation of a broadly two-tier system of education with exclusionary and marginalising 
results (Sayed and Soudien 2005, Carrim 2001). The promise of a benevolent, public-minded 
middle class as a key agent of transformation in post-apartheid society has still to be realised. 
While school governance policies have largely exacerbated inequities, educational policies 
aimed at educational re-dress also provide opportunities to challenge inequities if 
strategically applied.  
While school governance in South Africa has been the subject of a fair degree of analysis, 
a comprehensive narrative of its evolution in the context of education policy reform and class 
based inequality has not been the subject of academic debate. This article seeks to remedy 
this deficit by examining the system of school governance and its effects from the perspective 
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of key policy-makers. The paper is based on interviews with senior policy makers and with 
representatives of the ruling party, the African National Congress (ANC), the official 
opposition, the Democratic Alliance (DA), and civil society representatives conducted 
between 2013 and 2015, and also analysis of key education and macro-development political 
texts.ii  
Context: the evolution of school governance policies in the democratic era 
The current schooling structure in South Africa is composed of about 25,720 ordinary schools 
in South Africa, and within that about 4% are independent/private schools. The national 
average learner-educator ratio in ordinary schools is 30, ranging from 27 in the Free State to 
32 in the Northern Cape province (Department of Basic Education 2015). About 64% of all 
learners in public schools are in no-fee-paying schools, which are in general under resourced 
and located in deprived and marginalised locations. The remaining 36% of learners are is fee 
paying public schools.  
The origins of the current system are in educational policies enacted in the post-1994 
democratic era though its roots stretch back to the early 1990s with the enactment of the 
Model B and C regulations by the then ruling National Party (Carrim and Sayed 1992).  The 
school governance policies are based on the provisions of the Schools Act enacted in 1996 
and amended in 2003, and the National Norms and Standards for Schools Funding (NNSSF) 
(1998) enacted in 1998 and amended in 2006. The South African Schools Act (SASA) 
(Department of Education 1996: 8) created school governing bodies in every school as 
juristic persons and devolved significant powers to school governing bodies (SGBs) as a 
mechanism for broad-based participation for school communities. SGBs are composed of the 
school principal together with elected representatives of parents, educators, non-teaching staff 
and (in secondary schools) learners. SASA transferred significant powers to schools 
including admission, language policy and crucially the power to appoint both educators and 
non-educator staff. Parents have a majority stake in these arrangements.  
The assumption that underpinned this approach was that those parents or guardians 
who pay school fees should have the power to manage schools as they see fit, subject to 
certain regulations. Since the original Schools Act the state has redefined governance 
policies. For example, since 2002 SGBs are no longer consulted when allocating new 
educators as well as educators who return after a break. The allocation is governed by the 
2002 Education Laws Amendment Act and performed directly by the provincial departments 
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of education (Republic of South Africa  2002). Nonetheless, as argued below, they still have 
significant powers. 
The NNSSF is a fiscal policy introduced in October 1998 (Department of Education  
1998), which provided guidelines on how provinces should fund schools and which schools 
are eligible for fee exemption based the extent of poverty in the local catchment area of the 
school. The NNSSF allowed public schools to charge fees and have total control over their 
budget. While the minimum charge reported was R50 per month, some schools charge 
R4,000 per month, highlighting the significant inequities in education expenditure between 
the rich and the poor (Department of Education 2003). There is thus a substantial 
differentiation between schools that charge fees. 
To mitigate some of the inequities, the amended version of NNSSF (2006) created a 
group of fee free schools, which do not charge compulsory school fees.iii These schools in 
Quintiles 1 to 3 receive an increased allocation from the provincial education department to 
offset revenues previously generated through school fees.iv Although the ‘no fees school’ 
status is determined provincially, a national standard procedure is followed. This procedure is 
based on three poverty indicators: income, unemployment rate, and level of education of the 
community. This amendment, from fee charging at all schools to a no-fees status for the 
majority of schools, signalled a significant policy shift.  Government policy was no longer 
viable as originally proposed in SASA, that the ‘governing body of a public school must take 
all reasonable measures within its means to supplement the resources supplied by the State in 
order to improve the quality of education provided by the school to all learners at the school’ 
(Department of Education 1996: section 36)  
The amended NNSSF attempted to tighten up the regulations for fee exemptions for poor 
pupils attending fee-charging schools by establishing regulations for fair criteria and 
procedures regarding the exemption of school fees for parents who are unable to pay them. 
However, these regulations are communicated to parents of the schools through the SGBs, 
which are the bodies that also decide the criteria for fees exemption. Thus SGBs representing 
parents in wealthier school still retain much power in setting fees and communicating with 
poor parents, notwithstanding the amendments.  
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Unpacking the post-apartheid governance policy trajectory.v 
School governance policies are analysed in this section in relation to the twin goals of 
democracy and equity.  
Community and parental involvement in school governance: the role of School Governing 
Boards in a post-apartheid democracy. 
Democratisation and greater community control was a key imperative underpinning post-
apartheid education policy. SGBs were considered by many as a way in which education 
could be decentralised and local communities granted powers to manage their affairs 
privileging community and parental involvement.  
Notwithstanding the laudable ideals of democratisation, this approach had to contend 
with the class-fractured provision of education. In other words the middle-class was better 
able to take advantage of the opportunities provided by the democratisation of school 
governance. Some government policy makers suggested that since 1994, as a result of the 
new opportunities afforded to black people from financially advantaged backgrounds, 
economic capability and social class have gradually begun to displace race as a source of 
inequality. Thus, despite the establishment of SGBs as vehicles of democracy, there is a ‘big 
debate’ according to a senior government policy maker on the value of the SGB model in 
terms of the differentiated capacity of communities, parents and students across 
approximately 26,000 schools to maintain an effective and genuinely democratic form of 
governance.  
A government policy-maker noted that the lack of the skills needed to undertake 
school governance as envisaged in policy, is a ‘barrier to participation’ in SGBs, particularly 
in majority-black rural communities.vi However, the same interviewee rebuked those who 
were exaggeratedly critical and unsympathetic towards the SGB model and disagreed with 
the call for SGBs to be ‘done away with’, suggesting a more compassionate approach: ‘you 
can’t blame our people like that’.vii Another government representative noted that the 
effectiveness of SGBs revolved around ‘the questions of leadership … community leadership 
as well as professional leadership in the schools, not administration – leadership.viii The lack 
of capacity in school governance, combined with the cultural capital of the wealthy parents, 
ensure that notwithstanding the intention to treat parents as ‘partners’ix in the educational 
enterprise, and to ‘trust communities not to mess it up’x inequities emerge over key functions 
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such as admissions (Pampallis 2003). The quote below from an NGO representative captures 
the magnitude of these inequities:  
We firmly believe the school governing body is a key lever that has to be pulled if 
you want to address education in South Africa. And that at the moment, because of 
the legislative framework, the limitations around previously disadvantaged schools 
and the kinds of social capital they have access to through their parent body just 
means that inequality between historically Model C schools and the previously 
disadvantaged schools is just going to keep growing wider and wider.xi 
In addition to greater democratisation and control, another driver in governance 
policies in the form of SGBs was to strengthen the public schooling system by preventing the 
flight of the middle-class. It was based on a transformation strategy which sought to ensure 
buy-in and support of the middle class for the public sector. This strategy, whilst obviously 
focused on the desegregation of schooling, is premised on the idea that members of the 
middle class are effective advocates of change and can act as the voice for reform if they are 
retained in the public sector through participation and fee charging as discussed below.xii 
The transformative potential of the middle-class in relation to the ‘public good’ has 
yet to be realised however. The evidence suggests that the middle class in South Africa is 
opting out of the idea of a comprehensive public sector. An individualist and self-interested 
ethos in the middle-class has resulted in a society that, interviewees argue, no longer shares a 
common public vision, as claimed here: 
When we got into democracy we did not deliberate hard enough to try and 
think of the type of society that we wanted, and we allowed a lot of things to 
just happen, and we had hoped that by allowing certain things to happen, 
we’d reach a particular vision of a ‘rainbow nation’. And we are very far 
from that because if you talk about a rainbow nation, if ever there is 
anything like that based on the principles of Ubuntu caring etc., I think we 
have moved 360 degrees away from that.xiii  
As this quote suggests, basing education policy on the idea that a middle class could become 
advocates of change for improving public education is problematic. This idea of social 
solidarity floundered on the reality that social class and wealth determines much of the lived 
realities in South Africa such as where individuals live, where they go to school, and who 
their friends are. This segregated experiential determination on the fault line of social class is 
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additionally overlaid with a differentiated race, gender, and geographical history. Middle 
class advocacy is thus limited by the fact that the middle-class experiences a different 
schooling reality in the context of an unequal society that structurally de-limits the 
possibilities for social solidarity. Thus experiential and social class determinations punctuate 
forms of agency in South Africa, facilitating and inhibiting it in contingent and unequal ways. 
These determinations suggest that while integration may have occurred at the formal system 
level, there is separation at the individual school, institutional, and personal level. The agency 
of the middle class then is enacted in spaces that remain segmented and separated, with tools 
that are shaped by experience and institution, and in ways that militate against the intended 
policy ideals of inclusivity and re-distribution. 
 
SGBs, parental involvement and school fees 
Democracy in school governance is intimately tied to the class differentiated policy of 
charging fees at some schools, but not at others. The most telling admission of the 
consequences of state policy is contained in the preamble to the Amendment of the National 
Norms and Standards for School Funding, which acknowledges that the policy continues to 
advantage those previously privileged and a ‘new de-racialised middle class’. This is stated as 
follows (Department of Education 2006: 10): 
Ironically, given the emphasis on redress and equity, the funding provisions 
of the Act appear to have worked thus far to the advantage of public schools 
patronised by middle-class and wealthy parents. The apartheid regime 
favoured such communities with high-quality facilities, equipment and 
resources. Vigorous fund-raising by parent bodies, including commercial 
sponsorships and fee income, have enabled many such schools to add to 
their facilities, equipment and learning resources, and expand their range of 
cultural and sporting activities. Since 1995, when such schools have been 
required to down-size their staff establishments, many have been able to 
recruit additional staff on governing body contracts, paid from the school 
fund.  
This differentiation of fee status introduced by the amendments to education policy was thus 
intended to correct inequities (as noted above). There are several reasons however why these 
amendments arguably do not erode the two-tier unequal education system in relation to 
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schools. First, despite financial aid to parents in the form of exemptions from school fees and 
the introduction of no-fee schools, working class parents still remain disadvantaged in current 
amended governance policies. This is because their access to fee exemption in fee charging 
schools is limited (discussed below). Moreover, fees often are not the only costs that the poor 
carry for schooling. There are also significant costs related to purchasing school uniforms and 
transport for example. Second, as noted above, the implementation of the exemption policies 
rest on the behaviours of SGBs serving the wealthy. Parents’ ambitions for their children’s 
education, it was suggested, thwarted the ‘thread’ of the policy intention to create an 
‘egalitarian society’ and cap school fees;xiv parents overrode this policy through SGBs, which 
determine the level of school fees. Thus the paradigm of choice in fee charging schools 
enables wealthy parents to exercise choice to pay more in fees for smaller classes. As one 
national government policy-maker presented the issue, ‘We have tried to cap the school fees, 
but it’s parents who set the school fees’.xv 
Third, the amendments do not consider that wealthier middle-class parents can inject 
private funds for their children’s education. Such an approach exacerbates, rather than 
reduces, inequities (Fiske and Ladd 2006). Equity cannot be measured by equal per capita 
state expenditure per pupil (Motala, 2006), given the extent to which private contributions 
significantly increase wealthier school’s financial resources in the form of fees and donations 
for example.  
Fourth, there is constant refrain amongst policy-makers and some stakeholders that 
fee charging is a way of maintaining quality, as no-fee schools may suffer from poor quality 
education. As the following government interviewee suggested: 
Government introduced no-fee schools. No-fee schools are excellent, but 
what about the quality of the education? So what is more important: the fact 
that it is free or the fact that it’s quality education? So I think there has to be 
that kind of balancing of these things.xvi  
Fifth, whilst the no-fee school policy provides a pre-specified minimum amount of 
funding from the government compensated to such schools for loss of school fee income,  
(Department of Education 2006:25), the majority of the items specified fall into what can be 
termed running costs (such as stationery, maintenance, services like electricity). Learning 
support materials like textbooks is the only item more directly related to learning. Schools 
that receive income from school fees –  Quintiles 4 and 5 school SGBs – do have the 
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autonomy to hire additional teachers in addition to those allocated by the provincial 
departments. These amendments therefore affected non-teaching allocations but failed to 
address the crucial inequality in teacher inputs and personnel spending. 
Wealthier schools also have on average a higher proportion of qualified educators 
(Isaacs 2015). As such the policies do not address the key assets of skilled and qualified 
teachers particularly at an inter-provincial level, as the following quote form an NGO 
representative suggests:  
So I think that a huge challenge [is the] obvious [and] unequal distribution of 
experienced and highly educated teachers ... given the fact that SGBs … can set 
school fees for schools and the money that comes in from those school fees can be 
used as ‘top ups’ or a way to set higher salaries, there is a creation of a quasi-market 
and so you have all the ... the highly qualified experienced proven teachers in Quintile 
5 schools. xvii 
Finally, the amendments still largely employs the quintile ranking as the basis for its 
pro-poor funding. Whilst several amendments to this have been made, it is still fundamentally 
a blunt instrument for effecting equity as it does not provide a robust measure of poverty 
(Chutgar and Kanjee 2009). The differential allocation of resources through the quintile 
system affects operating costs only, and does not address other fundamental drivers of 
inequity such as teacher allocations.  
In all the ways suggested above, notwithstanding the equity interventions of the fee 
and no-fee policy which accompanied recent school governance changes, it remains the fault 
line of education inequity. 
 
Racial re-segregation, the middle-class and new patterns of exclusion 
Whilst the argument thus far focuses on the governance of schooling as a class based 
differentiation with some racial desegregation there is a growing differentiation between the 
wealthier schooling quintiles or fee charging schooling, specifically the Quintile 4 and 5 
schools. Enrolment figures shows for quintiles the years 2003, 2007 and 2013 demonstrate 
that in 2013 the majority of white (87%) learners went to the wealthier Quintile 5 schools. 
This data is fairly consistent between 2003 and 2007 (Family Health 1nternational360 2015: 
13). However, between 2007 and 2013 there was a growing concentration of white learners 
into fee-paying schools, that is Quintile 4 and Quintile 5 which is the year when the no-fee 
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paying school policy was introduced. A similar pattern is observed amongst Indian learners. 
In the same period the percentage of learners in Coloured fee-paying schools decreased from 
70% to 59% and in the equivalent African schools from 20% to 16%. It is of concern that re-
segregation by race may be on the increase judging from this evidence and worth examining 
in greater detail.  
The complex ways in which class and race occurs in the semi-private schooling 
system reveals several discernible features.xviii First, for many wealthy middle class black 
parents the desegregation of schooling has resulted in choices which have enabled them to 
send their children to previously white only schools. One national government policy-maker 
spoke about his children being able to mix with their peers from all races and that colour was 
not the focus of the children’s attention.xix Despite this positive view, the experience of many 
in such schools is assimilation into a dominant school culture rather than meaningful 
integration. 
Second, while integration does occur at the wealthier schools, poorer schools remain 
racially homogeneous largely due to the geographic patterns of residential occupation. 
... You promote diversity. So these are like the hard issues … the spatial residential 
areas, you know where learners go to school are pretty homogenous. And so how do 
you handle integration ... xx 
Third, what is emerging is the rise of some commuter inner city schools which are 
becoming predominantly black. Whiles there is not exact data on this, research, Sayed et al 
(2016) note that these schools serve largely inner city migrant populations or those from 
townships who use public transport to access these schools. This phenomenon has exposed 
the limitation of the quintile system as a system for classifying schools and national and 
provincial departments have been forced to reclassify such schools from, for example, 
Quintile 5 to lower quintiles or being declared no fee schools.   
Fourth there has been, as a consequence of the school governance policies, a certain 
amount of ‘racial hopping’. This is the process by which black African, Coloured and Indian 
learners ‘hop’ and cross geographical boundaries of educational privilege, but do not 
fundamentally erode the patterns of hegemonic power that underpin such privilege (Fataar 
2015). These movements across boundaries of privilege also suggest a degree of de-
racialisation but the fact is that poorer schools in the townships remain predominantly 
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African, under-resourced and are not the first choice for those who can exercise choice. A 
public official interviewed explains the differentiation in the following way: 
… so basically there is a system that is the former white model C schools and they 
are becoming more integrated so they are not white anymore. So it’s the former 
upper level State funded schools who are now partly State and private funded 
because they charge reasonably fairly high fees ... so that’s the one part of the 
system let’s call it the former Model C schools and then you’ve got the 2nd system - 
black, rural, blacks, black State urban and rural schools. 
What this suggests is that while there is some de-racialisation  occurring within the previous 
ex-Model C, previous House of Representatives (HOR), and previous House of Delegates 
(HOD) schools, the majority of  ex-Model C schools still remain largely homogeneous in 
social class and racial terms  Thus at the top end of the public education system there are 
schools that are becoming increasingly more exclusivist and drawing a strong middle class 
lager of wealthy learners across the racial divides. This form of desegregation of schooling 
based on social class paradoxically results in new forms of social exclusion. What racial 
hopping (Chisholm 2004) has resulted in, is a particular form of school migration – some 
poor learners migrating from schools in the townships to schools in the suburbs and inner-
cities or to previous HOR and previous HOD schools which, whilst they may charge fees, are 
considered to be a better option than the schools in the townships. Inequalities are 
perpetuated as comparatively wealthier parents exercise choice for a better education for their 
children with their purchasing power which has the consequence of diminishing the social 
and cultural capital and resources available in the ‘township’ schools 
The above analysis alerts us to the problem of retaining the middle class in the public 
educational system to ensure they become ‘advocates of change’. From a social policy 
perspective, this is a plausible argument, as the middle class, by exercising their voice and 
power, could be effective agents of change in poorly functioning schools. Retaining the white 
middle class in the immediate post-1994 period was also imperative, as policy-makers at that 
time feared an exodus of white parents from public schools and what they perceived as a 
collapse of public schooling. However, as argued above, what was set in motion was the 
capture of segments of the public schooling system by a de-racialised wealthy and middle 
class group. This in effect created a two-tier system with the middle class located in well-
resourced well functioning schools, and the vast majority of the poor in under-resourced 
poorly functioning schools. As such this group is unlikely to be advocates of system wide 
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reform as their spatialised experiences of schooling is segmented from the schooling reality 
of the majority. These new geographies of unequal and differentiated access in the school 
sector are the direct result, albeit arguably unintended, of policies on school governance. The 
fiscal provisions of the funding formulae have thus resulted in the creation of a broadly two-
tier system and policy with exclusionary and marginalising results (Sayed and Ahmed 2009, 
Sayed and Soudien 2005, Carrim 2001).  
 
Decentralisation, national and provincial relationships 
In addition to the polices discussed above on governance and fee exemption and their effects 
on differentiated schooling another key mechanism that effects equality in schooling is the 
organisation of schooling between the national and provincial levels of government.    
In South Africa, formal education and the management of schooling is a joint 
responsibility of national and provincial governments. Provincial educational authorities have 
the freedom to determine substantive matters such as school management, textbooks, and 
precise budgetary allocation, whereas the national institutions determine norms and standards 
(Department of Education  1996). As noted above, a key feature of the evolution of 
governance was the decentralisation to the school. This was linked to a corresponding 
decentralisation of schooling to the provincial level.  
Provinces and their schools largely have decision-making freedom, though this 
independence can clash with the will of national authorities. In the view of some policy-
makers, provincial autonomy disempowers the national Department of Education from 
decisively intervening as required to achieve equity. Centralisation, considered the broad 
tendency of the ruling ANC, South Africa's governing political party, is necessary to effect 
redress, in the view of the ANC-affiliated interviewees.  
For those from the opposition Democratic Alliance (DA) party ruling the Western 
Cape, more decentralised government would ensure democracy and allow provinces to 
respond to their particular educational needs: 
let’s not centralise, let’s leave … the diversity and the provincial 
departments to do their own thing because there are unique circumstances in 
EC [Eastern Cape] and in the WC [Western Cape] which a provincial 
department can deal with much better than having it centralised.xxi  
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Similarly, 
We want to preserve provincial autonomy on these things because we 
believe that it better answers the different socio-demographical, 
geographical needs of a diverse population. If everything is centrally 
planned, it often overrides the diversity; it doesn't tap into the energy in that 
diversity.xxii 
 
The quotes above suggest that centralised government for the opposition DA party is unable 
to address the diverse socio-economic contexts of the nine individual provinces, implying 
that provincial differentiation can most effectively ‘better answer […] needs’ and increase 
equity on a provincial level. xxiii  
In contrast, central government policy-makers suggest that this is being reconsidered 
and that, since 1994, the role of government, especially regarding education, had become 
more ‘emboldened and interventionist’.xxiv This, potentially, has implications for school 
governance in terms of increased intervention by the educational authorities in schooling and 
a ‘broader view of governance’.xxv An example was raised from the first post-apartheid 
administration: the national government allocated a certain amount of the budget for 
education on a national level, but because provinces allocated their own education budget, 
provinces could allocate less. 
The dialectic in education between national norm setting and provincial concurrent 
powers to administer and manage schooling has resulted in a situation whereby provinces can 
alter or thwart the equity intentions, weak as they may be, of governance policies. This 
speaks to a larger concern about whether the semi-federal nature of South African polity is 
able to effect equity (van Niekerk 2012). 
 
Conclusion: addressing inequity in education governance through bold policy 
intervention aimed at re-distribution 
The evolution of school governance is on the one hand a tale of unintended 
consequences despite a conscious effort to effect [redress and achieve equity and 
democratisation. On the other hand it is a narrative of persistent education inequities set 
against a wider canvas of societal inequities emerging from a long history of 
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colonisation, segregation and apartheid. There are two differing but complementary 
alternatives proffered as a way of addressing the systemic unintended outcomes of 
policy discussed in this article. The first proposed alternative, expressed by several 
policy-makers and one that is a common popular refrain, is that there is a segment of 
the public schooling system that works and that is attractive to many parents. That 
segment, as this paper has argued, is the schools largely serving the middle-class and 
are predominantly the fees paying schools. However, due to the de-racialisation and 
differentiation within this band, performance is not uniform.  
          The success of this model it is argued should be the basis for reforming public 
schools. Scaling up this semi-private system is a potential solution to the challenges of 
quality in many public schools (cf South African Institute of Race Relations  2011). 
Further, it is argued that that ex-Model C schools are not impermeable to black and 
non-middle class learners, in that there is some movement across race into the system, 
due in part to government-sponsored initiatives (du Toit 2004). Though it might be 
attractive to believe that this is a promising trend, generalising this approach is 
problematic for several reasons.  
          The better resourced ‘ex-Model C’ segment of public schooling operates, by 
default, a selective admission policy. The spatialised geographic inequities of post-
apartheid society and the soft zoning catchment policy, by which most students are 
selected based on residential proximity, makes it virtually impossible for large 
movements across race and class. Thus, mainly pupils from wealthier middle-class 
families can afford to live in neighbourhoods providing admission to these schools. As 
such, they largely cater to the needs of the wealthier strata of the middle classes in 
South Africa, reflecting structural and deep-seated inequities in location. Demographic 
advantage cannot be scaled up without addressing fundamental inequities in the 
distribution of wealth in South African society.  
          Moreover, these schools are able to achieve better educational outcomes 
precisely because they are highly unequal. They operate in an inequitable societal 
context; it is inequality that explains their success and not necessarily their educational 
approaches. They do well because the soft zoning policy accompanying governance 
policies advantages the middle-class in wealthier neighbourhoods. Schooling advantage 
is nested in broader community and socio-economic advantages. Moreover, an obvious 
consequence of spatialised social inequity is that the upper bands of the public school 
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sector, which in effect function as semi-public schools, are able to implement measures 
strongly associated with high educational outcomes. These include employing highly 
skilled personnel and reducing class sizes. It is difficult to see how such a system can 
be generalised to schools where there are no fees and students have greater education 
and learning disadvantages in poorly resourced neighbourhoods. A semi-private school 
sector catering to a privileged constituency cannot become a norm for a well-
functioning and truly public education system. It is difficult, indeed nigh impossible, to 
see how success in such schools can be a contextually and ahistorically transposed onto 
poorer contexts. It is conceivable to argue that such schools can accommodate some 
learners from poor backgrounds, but this often is limited and selective in that it favours 
the most able learners from disadvantaged background and cannot, as discussed below, 
accommodate over ten million learners currently in poorly resourced mainly township 
schools. 
          Whilst the alternative above seeks to generalise from what works for a select few 
schools to the entire public schooling system, a second alternative suggested is to 
extend the choice paradigm of school governance. This is by suggesting that parents are 
given the option of opting out of the public sector and enrolling in low-cost private 
schooling. Citing a litany of familiar quality woes in public education listed in this 
article including poor learner attainment and poor governance structures, proponents of 
this approach suggest that the solution is to encourage movement away from the public 
sector. The following extract from an article by Bernstein (2013) is typical of many 
such arguments: 
Low fee private schooling in South African is growing rapidly. … 
meanwhile the public sector is shrinking … In poor communities, where 
public schooling is described by the government as dysfunctional (and 
worse by others), why should parents who decide to attend a local private 
school receive so much less per pupil than is spent on pupils in government 
schools?  
Advocates of this approach argue that a voucher system, which is considerably less than what 
the state spends on education, could be given to parents to opt out of the public system.  
In a South African Institute of Race Relations (SAIRR) Policy Brief entitled ‘(L)evelling the 
educational playing field’, Kane-Berman (2014: 2) argues:  
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Education needs to be liberated from the current almost universal top-down 
bureaucratic centralised model of state control in favour of a decentralised model. 
Schools in such a model would be run by boards accountable not to officials, but to 
parents. South Africa already has at least 3 500 such schools. We need more. One way 
to inspire more is for the state to give all parents bursaries in the form of vouchers to 
buy education for their children from the provider of their choice, whether a private 
school or a school run as a business, or a former model C, or an ordinary government 
school. Schools, now often being run to suit the South African Democratic Teachers’ 
Union (Sadtu), would become schools run for the benefit of pupils.   
The view of private schooling divided government interviewees. For some, greater 
privatisation was preventing government from taking decisive actions; the example was cited 
of how the private sector hindered the implementation of the policy on standardised school 
uniforms. A minority of government interviewees expressed the opinion that the private 
sector should ‘fill the gap’ and play a significant role in SGBs, given its expertise, for 
example, in management and financial skills.  
Whilst there is much heat to the debate, the private sector actually caters for less than 
5% of all South African learners and accounts for less than 9% of all schools (Sayed et al 
2016). This notwithstanding, claims by the Independent Schools Association of South Africa 
(ISASA) that this sector has risen by over by 40% over the past five years (from 2010). Thus 
much of the debate is not about size or growth but about the future shape of the schooling 
sector. What is envisaged is a system of provision in which the logic of school choice is 
extended to encompass free movement of learner from public to private schools, sanctioned 
and supported by the state through vouchers.  
There are several criticisms of this line of argument (Motala and Dieltiens 2008, Vally 
and Motala 2013). Vally and Motala in particular provide a cogent overview of the critique 
including the erosion of the idea of public schooling as a public good. The key issue however, 
for this paper, is that, if ‘88 percent of African state schools are poor performers’ (Kane-
Berman 2014: 6) then it is difficult to conceive how a low-fee private school system can 
accommodate about ten million learners who are educationally disadvantaged and come from 
poorly resourced homes.  Moreover, it is unclear why a problem of education quality in 
public schooling can be remedied by commodifying education through self-interested private 
providers accountable to shareholders and not to an electorate protecting the constitutional 
right to provision of education as a public good. There is very little empirical data which 
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suggest that low fee private schools can improve the quality of public schools (see Ashley  et 
al 2014).  
Clearly both options infusing education policy discourses are, for the reasons 
discussed above, problematic. More fundamentally they limit the option for establishing 
meaningful mechanisms to effect cross class and cross race solidarity which is what is 
required.  
Cross class solidarity involves developing strategies to tackle the differentiated 
system of public provision which are informed by values and principles that affirm education 
as a collective public good and are underpined by an ethic of social justice. It would 
guarantee the redistribution of resources and opportunities. To this end what is required are 
significant changes to the governance of education within the framework of existing 
legislation, and extending it where necessary. This proposal is about the long march through 
public institutions to ensure that they become democratic spaces of quality learning. 
Tentative suggestions are made for discussion and debate which seek to ensure that schools 
serving the most marginalised become magnets of quality.  
First, there needs to be a more active and clear strategy for the redistribution of 
physical and human resources to areas of greatest need. This could entail ensuring that 
schools that charge fees redeploy some of the revenues generated to poorer schools. This 
could be in the form of active partnership between privileged and less privileged schools. In 
addition, and, most importantly, to employ more and better teachers it is necessary to institute 
measures that redirect human resources from privileged schools to areas that are most in 
need. It is imperative that ‘qualified, motivated, and committed teachers’, as ‘the single most 
important determinant of effective learning’ be placed in poorer schools (Sayed 2008: 7). To 
this end, there is an urgent need to ensure, through policy changes, that schools educating 
learners from the most deprived backgrounds have the best teachers. Multiple strategies 
should be deployed that ensure teachers are re-distributed from privileged schools to schools 
that need them most. Such teachers would not belong to a school, but would teach across 
schools. Targeted and attractive incentives would need to be offered to these teachers. Such a 
system of teacher deployment might reduce some of the divisions of the South African 
schooling system. Schools with private income in the form of fees and assertive governing 
bodies presently benefit disproportionately by attracting the best teachers. Whilst 
redistributing teachers may be difficult, as witnessed in the post-apartheid teacher rightsizing 
and rationalisation policy,xxvi an active equity driven system is crucial. 
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Second, more attention should be paid to re-examining the policy of decentralisation 
in general and education devolution in particular. The post-1994 process of education 
decentralisation has occurred in a context of great social inequity, and has exacerbated rather 
than reduced education inequity across provinces. Provincial capacity to deliver quality 
education is uneven and constrained by inherited legacies. For example, the Eastern Cape 
shows little progress across areas of poverty, in particular those geographic locations which 
were part of the former bantustans (Noble et al 2014). Provincialisation, as an outcome of the 
post-1994 settlement, requires revision to achieve social justice in education. Greater equity 
requires more interventionist approaches. 
There are possibilities for educational intervention along the lines discussed in the 
form of the current proposed education reforms. The new policy on ‘The organisation, roles 
and responsibilities of education districts’ was issued in 2013 (Department of Basic 
Education  2013). Titled ‘Effective districts, better quality’ this policy has sought to 
recentralise authority with emphasis on the monitoring role of districts and the managerial 
role of school leadership. The new policy empowers district offices to become effective links 
between provincial Education Departments (PEDs), their respective education institutions 
and the public. The focus on districts is prominent in the Medium Term Framework to 2019 
and begins to counter the school choice paradigm by returning elements of centralised 
accountability to the system through district support mechanisms. Localised centralisation 
offers the possibility for effecting changes consistent with both a commitment to democracy 
and equity, fostering cross class solidarity by appointing teachers to districts, for example, 
instead of schools, even if poorer school are still racially and class homogeneous. The 
districts can thus begin a process of re-centralising authority to ensure that the atomisation 
and self-aggrandisement of individual schools and SGBS enacted in current policy is 
mitigated to create greater forms of equity and cross class solidarity. 
Greater cross class solidarity has been made possible recently by the Constitutional 
Court judgement in favour of the Gauteng Department of Education (GDE) with respect to 
school zoning. The judgment argued that it was perfectly rational for the GDE to determine 
the zoning policy of schools which in effect means that the department will now have the 
final say over government schools’ admissions processes. This judgment was an order against 
the Federation of School Governing Bodies which challenged the proposed regulations, 
arguing that they undermine school autonomy. However, the Constitutional Court judges 
unanimously agreed the department should determine the feeder zones for schools as they 
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have an overall perspective of education in the province, and that such a move did not 
undermine the substantive powers of SGBs. This landmark judgement, if implemented, 
effectively undermines the selective admission policy of the wealthier public schools and 
thereby enabling greater forms of cross class solidary and movement across schools. 
While it would be naive to assume that these proposals (above), in and of themselves 
will altogether eradicate enduring, deep-seated historic and structural inequities, they do chart 
a more progressive approach for eroding the unequal differentiation of the public education 
system and creating a unified, comprehensive system. In this way the proposals begin to steer 
a pathway between abandoning the poorest segment of the public education system (low fee 
private school option), or transposing models uncritically (generalising the ex-Model C 
option), or turning over public school management to private companies and NGOs. By 
building on reforms already in motion and recent Constitutional Court judgements, whilst 
acknowledging that such interventions are necessary across the system as a whole, the 
proposals suggested above seek to animate a social justice transformation agenda in school 
governance and effect meaningful cross class solidarity. This represents a meaningful 
alternative to the current model which unintentionally facilitates the ‘opting out’ of the public 
education system by the middle-class. 
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iiiThe formula and how a school could apply for a ‘no fees’ status are discussed in sections 126A to 126E of the 
policy. 
iv In the amendment to the South African Schools Act 1996 (SASA) in 2006 and the subsequent amendment to 
the National Norms and Standards for School Funding (NNSSF), parents in Quintiles 4 and 5 schools still make 
compulsory fee contributions to schools in order to ‘top up’ school funding. Students in schools that charge fees 
may apply to gain partial or full exemption from paying any school fees based on need, as specified by the NNSSF 
policy. In contrast, schools in Quintiles 1 to 3 are exempt from paying any fees. 
vTeachers are a key constituency in current school governance policies. However, this paper mainly focuses on 
the role of the parents. Teacher involvement is dealt with in more extensive detail in a forthcoming book chapter 
by the main author. 
vi Interview with senior policy-maker 3. 
vii Interview with senior policy-maker 3. 
viii Interview with senior policy-make 5. 
ix Interview with senior opposition leader 1. 
x Interview with senior policy-maker 1 
xiInterview with an NGO representative 1. 
xii This was the key conclusion of international consultants to the MoE on school governance options during the 
development of the SASA. 
xiii Interview with senior policy-maker 6. 
xiv Interview with senior policy-maker 7. 
xvInterview with senior policy-maker 7. 
xviInterview with senior policy-maker 4. 
xviiInterview with NGO representative 3. 
xviiiFataar (2015) offers a most instructive read of the school subjectivities across post-apartheid school space. 
He argues that much of what occurs is a dislocation between residential location and schooling mobility although 
in this paper it is argued that it is limited and occurs at the margins. The inextricable link between wealth, 
schooling and race persists it is argued, although class begin to displace race to some extent resulting in class 
based segregated public schooling system. 
xix Interview with senior policy-maker 4. 
xx Interview with a senior policy-maker 3. 
xxi Interview with DA senior policy advisor 1 the WC. 
xxii Interview with DA senior policy advisor 1 in the WC. 
xxiii Interview with DA senior policy advisor1 in the WC. 
xxivInterview with senior policy-maker 7. 
xxvInterview with senior policy-maker 7 
xxvi The teacher rationalisation, redeployment and redistribution policy emanated from findings and 
recommendation in the Department of Education, The National Teacher Audit Report (1995).is this a reference?? 
done] It sought to achieve greater equity, through a more equitable distribution of teachers across different schools 
and provinces. As part of this redeployment process, those teachers who were not willing to move to other schools 
could apply for voluntary severance packages (VSPs). The right-sizing teacher remuneration policy sought to 
ensure that salaries no longer reflected racial and gender inequities.  
